Game Theory - Kenneth OYE
In recent years, liberal theorists have adopted game theory from the field of economics. As it turns out, game theory is as applicable to the study of political decision-making as it is to the study of economic decision-making. Though liberalism is historically rooted in idealism, game theoretical models have proven that liberalism is plausible according to rigorous logical reasoning. Like Kant's liberal internationalism, liberalist game theory can reasonably show when states will conflict and when they will cooperate. In "Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics, Kenneth Oye outlined some of the factors and circumstances that determine cooperativity between states. (Kenneth Oye, "The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics," in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues ed. Robert Art and Robert Jervis. Adapted from Kenneth A. Oye "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies," in World Politics: pp 1-22.) The ordering of preferences sets up the payoff structure, and is the most fundamental factor determining cooperativity. Issue linkage, iteration of negotiation, and reciprocal "tit-for-tat" policy can improve the likelihood of cooperation in most scenarios (Oye, 80-85). Transaction costs, information and communication problems, and a greater number of players can reduce the likelihood of cooperation (Oye, 84 -88).
Three Examples of Game Theory Scenarios
In Prisoner’s Dilemma, mutual cooperation provides the best total happiness, but there is an issue of trust because unilateral defection provides greater happiness to one agent. Iteration of Prisoner’s Dilemma combined with tit - for - tat policy can create greater likelihood of cooperation.
Examples of real-world PD in IR include arms reduction agreements and emissions control agreements. (Oye, 79). |
Stag Hunt is in many ways like Prisoner's Dilemma except that in Stag Hunt mutual cooperation is individually preferable to unilateral defection. Therefore, Stag Hunts are more likely to foster cooperation than Prisoner's Dilemma. Moreover, a PD can be changed into a SH in situations where the benefits of an opponent's defection can be mitigated. In the case of arms reduction, the use of defense-focused arms can shift PD to SH.
(Oye, 79). |
Chicken is like Prisoner's Dilemma except that unrequited cooperation is preferable to mutual defection. Defection is therefore less likely than Prisoner's dilemma because its potential costs are greater. Unlike Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma, iteration may reduce the likelihood for cooperation because a reputation for cooperation reduces an opponent's timidity towards defection.
One example of real-world Chicken in IR is, (depending on one's perspective) nuclear brinksmanship. (Oye, 79). |