Liberalist Theory - Andrew moravcsik
There is no good reason, Andrew Moravcsik argues, that liberalism must operate only as idealism. IR theorists (and even liberalists themselves) have long dismissed the possibility of a rigorous liberalist IR theory. In Taking Preferences Seriously, Andrew Moravcsik creates exactly that. By separating liberalist analysis from ideological prescription, Moravcsik comes to the conclusion that the fundamental insight of liberalism is that social actors define state behavior by selecting state preferences (Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously; A Liberal Theory of International Politics”. International Organization, 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53. https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf (accessed 2/26/2014). ).
Three Core Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory
I) Unit Level - "The Primacy of Societal Actors"
The unit of liberalist IR theory is the societal actor, which is an individual or group of individuals that have a specific set of interests that exist regardless of politics. Societal actors conflict or cooperate with each other based on ideological similarity or dissimilarity, material scarcity, and political power. This idea rests on a very different conception of political power than realism. For liberalist IR theory, power is not the capability for force, but the capability for effective collective political action. Political power is based as much on social status and willpower as it is on raw force. Coalitions of societal actors form around alignments of interest and political power (Moravcsik 516-17).
II) State Level - "Representation and State Preferences"
The state is a domestic representative mechanism. State preferences, defined as the ordering of possible outcomes, are drawn from the interests of the dominant coalition of domestic societal actors. Different forms of social and political organization favor certain societal actors more than others, privileging certain groups towards representation. Moreover, different forms of state organization can create more or less unified foreign policies. Failed states and governments with a separation of powers can both project multiple foreign policies. The function of the state is based on legitimacy derived from domestic actors. Through emigration, disobedience, and international institution alliance, actors have exit strategies to withdraw their resources from states as representative mechanisms (Moravcsik 518-20).
III) Systemic Level - "Interdependence and International System"
Foreign policy is created when the preferences, generated through a domestic process of coalition building, of various states are matched against each other. More precisely, the externalities (positive, negative, or non-existent) imposed by the achievement of a state's preferences on other states create interdependence between state preferences. If the preferences of two states inflict negative externalities on each other, then the states will have conflictual behavior. If the preferences of two states generate positive externalities for each other, then the states will have cooperative behavior. If, as is most common, the externalities of preferences are mixed, then both conflict and cooperation are possible, and the scale can be tipped in either direction. This conception of inter-state politics flips the realist understanding of ends and means. In realist structural theory, differences in state behavior are based on differences in means and ends are treated as static. In liberalist structural theory, differences in state behavior are based on differences in ends and means are treated as relatively static. Because total war, in which absolute destruction of the enemy, is rare in history, Moravcsik argues that privileging capabilities over goals (as realists do) in predicting state interactions is illogical. Liberalist theory adopts the analyses of realist theory only in the specific and limited situations where the preferences of states are in direct opposition, so that interaction between the states is a zero-sum game (Moravcsik 520-23).
Three Core Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory
I) Unit Level - "The Primacy of Societal Actors"
The unit of liberalist IR theory is the societal actor, which is an individual or group of individuals that have a specific set of interests that exist regardless of politics. Societal actors conflict or cooperate with each other based on ideological similarity or dissimilarity, material scarcity, and political power. This idea rests on a very different conception of political power than realism. For liberalist IR theory, power is not the capability for force, but the capability for effective collective political action. Political power is based as much on social status and willpower as it is on raw force. Coalitions of societal actors form around alignments of interest and political power (Moravcsik 516-17).
II) State Level - "Representation and State Preferences"
The state is a domestic representative mechanism. State preferences, defined as the ordering of possible outcomes, are drawn from the interests of the dominant coalition of domestic societal actors. Different forms of social and political organization favor certain societal actors more than others, privileging certain groups towards representation. Moreover, different forms of state organization can create more or less unified foreign policies. Failed states and governments with a separation of powers can both project multiple foreign policies. The function of the state is based on legitimacy derived from domestic actors. Through emigration, disobedience, and international institution alliance, actors have exit strategies to withdraw their resources from states as representative mechanisms (Moravcsik 518-20).
III) Systemic Level - "Interdependence and International System"
Foreign policy is created when the preferences, generated through a domestic process of coalition building, of various states are matched against each other. More precisely, the externalities (positive, negative, or non-existent) imposed by the achievement of a state's preferences on other states create interdependence between state preferences. If the preferences of two states inflict negative externalities on each other, then the states will have conflictual behavior. If the preferences of two states generate positive externalities for each other, then the states will have cooperative behavior. If, as is most common, the externalities of preferences are mixed, then both conflict and cooperation are possible, and the scale can be tipped in either direction. This conception of inter-state politics flips the realist understanding of ends and means. In realist structural theory, differences in state behavior are based on differences in means and ends are treated as static. In liberalist structural theory, differences in state behavior are based on differences in ends and means are treated as relatively static. Because total war, in which absolute destruction of the enemy, is rare in history, Moravcsik argues that privileging capabilities over goals (as realists do) in predicting state interactions is illogical. Liberalist theory adopts the analyses of realist theory only in the specific and limited situations where the preferences of states are in direct opposition, so that interaction between the states is a zero-sum game (Moravcsik 520-23).